Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience by W. Braddock Hickman
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience
Volume Author/Editor: W. Braddock Hickman




Chapter Title: Agency Ratings
Chapter Author: W. Braddock Hickman
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2012
Chapter pages in book: (p. 139 - 210)AGENCY RATINGS
THE measures of aggregate investor experience examined in the
preceding chapter are of interest largely as background materials
against which our more detailed records may be compared and
examined. Because of the various legal rules governing invest-
ment processes and the canons under which prudent men cus-
tomarily operate, most investors are less concerned with the broad
aggregates than with the behavior of bonds rated as high grade
under various rating systems. The present chapter focuses attention
on the behavior of high grades as defined by the investment rating
agencies, using for that purpose a composite rating based on the
individual ratings assigned by Fitch, Moody's, Standard Statistics,
and Poor's. The next two chapters will examine the behavior of
high-grade bonds as determined by the legal lists and the market,
and Chapter 6 will present a comparative analysis of the different
rating systems.
The first section of this chapter treats briefly of the nature of
the composite agency rating used, of the availability of the data,
and of several official uses to which agency ratings have been put.
The volume of high-grade securities outstanding or flowing onto
the market determines the investment outlets available for the
financial intermediaries, such as savings banks, insurance com-
panies, personal trust accounts, and employee pension plans; the
next section therefore traces the principal trends in the volume
of high-grade bonds offered to, or outstanding in the market.
Agency ratings are in effect systems of gradation of corporate
bond issues according to their "investment quality," but the in-
vestment agencies do not divulge the precise factors and weights
employed in arriving at their systems of ratings. The third section
of the chapter attempts to throw indirect light on this matter by
an examination of the principal characteristics of issues having
different composite ratings. The investment agencies suggest that
the ratings are in effect long-run appraisals of the "intrinsic"
quality of corporate bonds (i.e. the ability of issues to withstand
default and capital loss over long periods in the future), and the
next section examines the extent to which these long-run ap-
praisals have, in fact, been altered to conform with short-run, and140 AGENCY RATINGS
largely temporary, ups and downs in general business. The chap-
ter closes with several sections on the subsequent experience of
bonds assigned different composite ratings at offering, on the
ability of the composite rating to forecast the risk of default
and ultimate capital loss, and on the experience record of different
groups of rated bonds held over assumed chronological periods.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Since 1909, the year in which corporate bonds were first rated by
Moody's Investors Service, the ratings assigned by the various in-
vestment agencies have constituted an important device for rank-
ing the quality of corporate bonds. The high tide of the rating
movement, in so far as mere coverage is concerned, occurred in
the period when ratings were assigned to over 98 percent
of the total par amount of all straight corporate bond issues Out-
standing. With the growth of private placements, which are us-
ually not rated by the agencies, the extent of the coverage then
declined. Nevertheless as late as 1944 over 92 percent of the par-
amount total of all issues outstanding was rated by one or more
agencies.
Investment intermediaries, as has been indicated, are particu-
larly interested in the volume of high-grade bonds available as
outlets for investment. In official usage, issues in the top four rat-
ing grades (roughly equivalent to issues rated Baa or better by
Moody's) are considered to be high grade; while others are pre-
dominantly speculative. Approximately three-quarters of the total
volume of old issues outstanding, as well as of new issues flowing
onto the market, is high grade inthissense, the remainder either
being rated low grade or not rated by the agencies.
Issues in the top four grades are eligible for purchase by com-
mercial banks and are usually accepted by examiners at book value
for purposes of life company and commercial bank asset valua-
tion. Conversely, defaulted issues and issues below the fourth
grade must be written down to market, and the capital loss (or
difference between book and market) charged against the sur-
plus account. Investors are thus interested in the stability of the
ratings, as measured by the volume of issues that are upgraded
or downgraded. When judged in this way, the stability of the rat-
ings leaves something to be desired. During most business cycles
the agencies upgraded some issues in good times and downgraded
considerably more in bad, with the result that the net volume ofAGENCY RATINGS 141
high-grade outstandings expanded and contracted with the busi-
ness cycle. Contrariwise, the volume of low grades contracted dur-
ing some business expansions and expanded during most business
contractions. By implication, the surplus accounts of the financial
intermediaries were cyclically unstable: they expanded during
good times when issues were upgraded and shrank during bad
times when issues were downgraded. If the downgraded issues
were not sold, the capital losses were frequently paper ones, since
many downgraded issues were promptly upgraded during the
next business expansion.
Because of a secular downgrading of issues in the l93O's, the
proportion of rated outstandings upgraded in expansion and peak
years of the general business cycle averaged close to zero but the
proportion downgraded in contraction and trough years averaged
6 percent. Upgrading was important only in the peak year 1923
(6 percent) while downgrading was particularly heavy in 1931 and
1932(11 percent in each year).
From the published statements of the investment agencies, it
appears that the ratings are an attempt to rank issues in order of
the probable risk of default and of the possible magnitude of the
default loss, issues in the top grade being those on which default
seems least likely to occur and issues in the lowest grade those al-
ready in default or for which default seems clearly imminent. On
the other hand, the agencies specifically warn against the use of
the ratings as a guide to the attractiveness of an issue (i.e. the
probable realized yield for the investor).
Our analysis indicates that the record of the agencies over the
period studied was remarkably good in so far as their ratings per-
tain to the risk of default. Although mistakes were made, with
great regularity issues rated as high grade at offering and at the
beginning of assumed chronological investment periods had lower
default rates than those rated as low grade. In addition, capital
losses, as measured by the difference between par value and market
price at default, were consistently smaller for the high grades that
went into default than for the low grades. And since market
prices declined less at default for the high grades than for the
low grades, realized yields from default to extinguishment were
lower on the high-grade issues than on the low. These results ap-
pear to support the investment agencies' own interpretation of the
purpose of their ratings.
Large investors, who are able to. diversify widely and thus142 AGENCY RATINGS
balance off default losses against capital gains, are interested in
the possible use of agency ratings and other quality measures not
only as a guide to default risks but also in helping to analyze
prospective or ultimate returns. Whether the ratings can be used
in this way would appear to depend upon the type and size of is-
sues acquired and the timing of purchases. On regular offerings of
large issues, realized yields from offering to extinguishment were on
the average higher on issues rated high grade by the agencies than
on those rated low grade; but on similar offerings of small issues,
the two groups did about the same. On the other hand, on irregu-
lar offerings of both size groups (issues offered in corporate re-
organizations, etc.) yields were usually much higher on the low
grades. As a result, for total offerings (regulars plus irregulars) the
highest returns were obtained on low-grade offerings, and the
same was usually true for bonds of outstanding issues purchased
in the market, excep.t those acquired at the beginning of periods
of heavy default. Rather regularly, loss rates on corporate bonds
varied with default rates, and thus were higher the lower the qual-
ity of the issue. The implication is that investors seeking price sta-
bility or the avoidance of heavy defaults did better during the
full period studied by concentrating on the top grades. Conversely,
large investors, particularly those able to withstand default and
in a position to acquire issues in corporate reorganizations, could
have obtained higher returns on the average on the low grades.
NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
COMPOSITE AGENCY RATING
The composite rating used in this study is a median of individual
coded agency ratings (Fitch, Moody's, Standard Statistics, and
Poor's).1 The codes assigned to the individual ratings were as
follows:
Fitch Moody Poor Standard Code
AAA Aaa A** A1+ I
AA Aa A* Al II
A A A A III
BBB Baa B** Bl+ IV
BB Ba B* BI V
B B B B VI
CCC Caa
C C C Cand lower IX
1 An earlier useofthe term "composite rating" wasbyPynchon and Co.
in their Annual Quotation Booklet, where it referred to a slightly different
type of average than the one used in this report.AGENCY RATINGS 143
The number of agency ratings available for the computation of
the composite rating of a particular issue on a particular observa-
tion date was determined by the number of agencies rating bonds
on that date and by whether or not the agencies assigned a rating to
the issue in question. Corporate bonds were not rated by any agency
prior to 1909, when Moody's ratings for railroads first appeared.
Moody's ratings for public utilities and industrials appeared in
1914, Poor's for all industries in 1922, and those of Standard Statis-
tics and Fitch—also for all industries—in 1924. Four ratings were
available for most of the large issues from 1924 through March
1941, when Poor's was merged with Standard Statistics; after that
date three ratings were usually available. Ratings are frequently
not assigned by the agencies to small issues of little public interest,
to private placements, and in situations where insufficient infor-
mation is available for purposes of rating. Before the postwar
growth in private placements, most issues were rated by one or
more agencies, so that a composite rating could be assigned to over
90 percent of the par-amount total of all issues outstanding from
1920 through 1944.
When only one rating could be obtained for an issue, the coded
value of that rating was used as the composite rating. If two rat-
ings were available, the composite is the arithmetic mean of the
coded values of the two, rounded downward in the event of a frac-
tional value to the next lower rating (i.e. grade ii is the composite
rating assigned an issue rated Aaa by Moody's and Al by Stand-
ard). For three ratings, the composite is the middle value of the
array of coded ratings; for four values, it is the arithmetic mean of
the middle two (rounded downward in the event of a split rating).
Ratings were assigned in this study at dates of offering and extin-
guishment; to outstanding issues, at quadrennial years; and to de-
faulted issues, at dates five years, two years, and one year before
default. For a selected group of actively traded issues ratings were
also assigned to outstandings at the beginning of each calendar
year. The ratings assigned to offerings were those appearing in
the first annual manual or monthly handbook showing the offer-
ing, provided the publication date was not more than one year
later than the offering. Thus railroad bond offerings in 1908 and
public utility and industrial bond offerings in 1913 were assigned
a rating at offering even though the first published ratings ap-
peared one year later. The ratings assigned at extinguishment
were those given in the manuals or handbooks published not more144 AGENCY RATiNGS
than one year before the date of extinguishment. Ratings assigned
quadrennially and annually to outstandings were those given in
monthly handbooks for April of the year in question whenever
they were available; otherwise the ratings were taken from the
annual manuals. The manuals usually appear in the summer or
fall of each year and reflect conditions around the first quarter of
the year.
As the rating agencies are careful to point out, the ratings are
intended to reflect intrinsic investment quality and are not de-
signed as guides to future price or yield experience. The agencies
do not divulge in detail the particular factors and weights used in
assigning the individual ratings, but it appears from the manual
descriptions that attention is given to such matters as earnings
coverage, lien position, capital structure, and growth and stability
of earnings. In our opinion the primary aim of the ratings is to
rank issues in the order of their relative freedom from default and
from the capital losses arising therefrom, issues with the highest
rating being those on which default is judged least likely to occur
and issues with the lowest rating those already in default or on
which default is imminent.
Issues rated in the first four rating grades by the investment
agencies (essentially our grades i—Iv) are generally considered to be
of "investment quality" by the agencies and by financial analysts,
while those of lower grades are considered "predominantly specu-
lative." Agency ratings have frequently been used as the basis for
such a classification by various state regulatory authorities, and
were brought into such use on a national scale by the Comptroller
of the Currency in an Investment Securities Regulation of Feb-
ruary 15, 1936.2 The Comptroller's regulation in effect restricts
bond purchases of all national banks and of state member banks
of the Federal Reserve System to marketable securities of invest-
ment quality. According to the Comptroller, "the purchase of 'in-
vestment securities' in which the investment characteristics are
distinctly or predominantly speculative, or 'investment securities'
of a lower designated standard than those which are distinctly or
predominantly speculative, is prohibited."3 A footnote to the
original regulation added that "the terms employed herein may be
2Fora detailed description of official and other uses of agency ratings, see
GilbertHarold's Bond Ratings as an Investment Guide (New York, 1938),
Chapter 3.
8FederalReserve Bulletin, March 1936, p. 195.AGENCY RATINGS 145
found in recognized rating manuals, and where there is doubt as
to the eligibility of a security for purchase, such eligibility must
be supported by not less than two rating manuals." The footnote
was subsequently attacked as placing too much authority in the
hands of the investment agencies,4 and was deleted under a revi-
sion effective July 1, Unofficial discussions with bank ex-
aminers indicate, however, that bonds rated in the first four
grades by two or more agencies are still generally conceded to meet
the Comptroller's requirements.
An additional official use of agency ratings is in figuring the net
sound capital of commercial banks, and in the establishment of
valuation standards for life insurance company investments. Thus
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Directors of the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency speci-
fied in a joint resolution of June 27, 1938 that securities in "Group
I" are to be carried at book value, such securities being described
as "marketable obligations in which the investment characteristics
are not distinctly or predominantly speculative." Under the reso-
lution, Group i is restricted to "obligations in the four highest
grades and unrated securities of equivalent value."0 Securities
failing to meet the rating test (Group ii securities) are valued at
the market price and fifty percent of the net depreciation is de-
ducted in computing net sound capital.7 Similar valuation pro-
cedures are imposed upon insurance companies by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. Bonds in the first four
4 See, for example, American Banker, August 12, 1q36.
5 Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1938, p. 566.
6 Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1938, p. 565. The Executive Committee of
the National Association of Supervisors of State Banks later subscribed to the
resolution, but some of the states did not adopt it and continue to adhere
to traditional valuation policies.
7 Securities in Groups iii and iv (securities in default and stocks) are valued
at market and the full net depreciation is deducted in determining the net
sound capital of the bank. The original 1938 resolution provided that se-
curities in Group it were to be valued at the average market price for the
eighteen months just preceding examination, but the rule was amended in 1949
to provide for valuation at the current market price, on the grounds that the
eighteen-months average was no longer of practical significance because of the
small volume of Group it securities in the portfolios of the banks. See "Revi-
sion in Bank Examination Procedure," Joint Statement of the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Executive Committee of the
National Association of Supervisors of State Banks, Federal Reserve Bulletin,
July 1949, pp. 776-77.146 AGENCY RATINGS
rating grades are fully amortizable as to income, and are accepted
at book value for purposes of insurance company asset valuation.
Other securities are required to meet certain specific tests, or fail-
ing those, are written down to market or to some conventional
estimate thereof. (Further details on valuation standards for life
company investments are provided in Chapter 5.) Despite recent
regulatory changes, bonds given a composite rating of i—iv in the
present report would usually be considered as substantially satis-
fying the Comptroller's requirements for commercial banks and
the N.A.I.C. ruling for insurance companies.
VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS OF RATED BONDS
Institutional investors in corporate bonds are primarily interested
in the volume and stability of securities eligible for investment
under different rating systems, and in the subsequent yield and
loss experience of such investments. Materials on the yield and
loss experience of bonds with different agency grades are pre-
sented and analyzed in the next section of this chapter; here we
shall examine the broad trends in the volume and characteristics
of rated bonds, and in the stability of the volume over selected
long periods and during business cycles.
Outstandings
Breakdowns by composite rating grade of the number and total
par amount of all straight corporate bond issues outstanding at
the beginning of the quadrennial years 1900, 1904, and so on, are
presented in Charts 6 and 7, and percentage distributions of the
par-amount totals are given in Table 27. The estimates in par
amount were obtained from data covering all large issues and the
10 percent sample of small issues, after adjustment of the latter
within major industry groups to sum to the par-amount totals
for all small issues. Because the large issues dominate the par-
amount totals, the breakdowns by amount are believed to be quite
accurate. The smaller issues occupy a more important position
relative to the total number of issues outstanding, and the break-
downs by number of issues are therefore believed to be less
accurate.
Since bonds were not rated by any agency until 1909 (the year
of the first Moody ratings for railroads), the quadrennial break-
downs begin in 1912. At that time 94 percent of the par amount
of all rail issues outstanding was rated by Moody's; and, sinceVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 147
almost 60 percent of the volume of outstandings then was com-
prised of rails, this represented better than 55 per cent of the total
for all industries combined. With the introduction of Moody
ratings for public utilities and industrials in 1914, and of other
ratings in 1922 and 1924, the percent of the par-amount total for
all rated issues rose from 88 percent in 1916 to 99 percent in 1924.
Thereafter the percent rated showed no significant change until
after 1940. With the growth of private placements, many of which
are not now rated by the agencies, the proportion of rated out-
standings gradually fell until it reached 92 percent by 1944.
Since then, the volume of private placements has expanded mark-
edly, and the proportion of issues rated by the agencies has con-
tinued to decline.
Both the absolute and relative amounts of issues rated as high
grade by the agencies (issues rated i—iv under our system) rose con-
tinually from 1912 to the beginning of 1928 ($7.7 billion or 50
percent of the total par amount in 1912; $22.6 billion or 85 per-
cent in 1928). Volumewise, the increase was particularly marked
in the period 1912—15, when public utility and industrial issues
were rated for the first time, and in 1924—27, when total offerings
expanded so greatly. Thereafter both the absolute and relative
amounts of high grades shrank steadily, especially during the
years 1928—35, so that by 1944 only $13.7 billion or 60 percent of
total outstandings were in the first four rating grades. The amount
of corporate bonds rated high grade by the agencies has failed to
keep pace with the volume of funds seeking high-grade invest-
ment outlets. Between 1912 and 1928, for example, the volume of
outstandings in the first four grades expanded by 194 percent,
while deposits of mutual savings banks more than doubled and
net reserves of life insurance companies (reserves plus accrued
dividends less premium notes and loans) increased by nearly 400
percent. Between 1928 and 1944 the funds of each of the prin-
cipal types of savings institutions continued to expand, while the
volume of corporate bond outstandings in the first four rating
grades shrank by 40 percent. To an appreciable extent such funds
found their way into the government bond market, into the mort-
gage market, and into direct placements (not rated by the
agencies).
Evidence of the dramatic shift that occurred in competent in-
vestment opinion during the Great Depression is provided by the
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1-Il 11111111 (low) Not rated















TABLE 27—Percentage Distributions of Outstandings among
High and Low Agency Ratings, Quadrennially 1912—44
COMPOSITERATING










1912 40.6% 9.7% 4.9% 44.8% $15,303.3
1916 49.9 23.4 14.7 12.0 17,226.6
1920 51.9 27.6 15.9 4.6 18,085.1
1924 48.3 34,3 16.4 1.0 21,035.3
1928 47.4 38.0 13.3 1.3 26,476.5
1932 33.2 36.9 28.1 1.8 29,014.0
1936 31.5 30.5 36.5 1.5 26,517.8
1940 27.6 28.8 41.5 2.1 25,360.5
1944 31.1 28.9 32.1 7.9 22,797.8
Railroads
1912 69.0 16.7 8.5 5.8 8,828.3
1916 63.5 16.0 14.8 5.7 9,662.1
1920 67.9 21.1 7.8 3.2 9,630.5
1924 70.0 19.1 10.6 0.3 9,727.0
1928 72.3 19.9 7.3 0.5 10,647.3
1932 43.6 35.1 21.1 0.2 11,292.0
1936 34.2 26.7 38.7 0.4 11,142.1
1940 14.0 23.1 60.5 0.4 10,826.8
1944 14.4 30.1 54.7 0.8 9,488.2
PublicUtilities
1912 0.5 0.1 0.1 99.3 4,268.3
1916 27.9 38.4 18.7 15.0 5,277.9
1920 23.5 38.2 32.7 3.6 6,074.4
1924 27.6 49.1 22.6 0.7 7,202.3
1928 33,9 50.1 15.3 0.5 10,214.4
1932 33.0 40.4 25.7 0.9 12,393.4
1936 36.0 31.8 31.6 0.6 11,623.3
1940 41.2 29.1 28.1 1.6 11,078.3
1944 47.9 23.0 17.8 9.3 10,369.8
ashigh grade by the agencies as late as 1928, while only 39 per-
cent was so rated in 1940. Utility issues were also rated downward
after 1928, although not so sharply as the rails (84 percent of the
par amount of utility outstandings had i—iv ratings in 1928; 68
percent in 1936), but the utilities were rated upward in the late
thirties on the basis of their excellent depression performance.
The statistics for industrials reflect several sharp reversals of opin-
ion between 1920 and 1944. At the beginning of 1920 industrials














1912 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 95.3% $2,206.7
1916 44.0 19.8 4.6 31.6 2,286.6
1920 59.3 26.9 5.9 7.9 2,380.2
1924 33.4 44.1 19.4 3.1 4,106.0
1928 25.0 50.2 20.5 4.3 5,614.8
1932 11.3 33.1 48.2 7.4 5,326.6
1936 9.3 37.6 45.4 7.7 3,752.2
1940 26.2 39.0 25.5 9.3 3,455.4
1944 26.0 38.4 9.7 25.9 2,939.8
LargeIssues
1912 47.6 11.3 6.0 35.1 10,928.2
1916 57.2 24.0 14.3 4.5 12,646.0
1920 59.2 26.1 13.3 1.4 13,668.1
1924 54.9 31.4 13.6 0.1 16,176.5
1928 52.8 36.5 10.3 0.4 21,251.3
1932 35.3 38.0 26.4 0.3 24,233.7
1936 33.3 31.2 35.1 0.4 22,777.5
1940 29.6 29.5 40.1 0.8 22,683.1
1944 33.0 30.3 31.6 5.1 20,845.0
Small Issues
1912 23.2 5.6 2.4 68.8 4,375,1
1916 30.4 21.5 15.5 32.6 4,580.6
1920 28.9 32.1 24.2 14.8 4,417.0
1924 26.0 43.8 26.0 4.2 4,858.8
1928 25.4 43.9 25.6 5.1 5,225.2
1932 22.7 31.5 36.3 9.5 4,780.3
1936 20.1 26.5 45.0 8.4 3,740.3
1940 10.7 22.2 53.8 13.3 2,677.4
1944 10.9 13.1 37.1 38.9 1,952.8
Based on Tables 2 and 3 of Statistical Measures: par-amount data for all
large (straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted
quadrennially to universe totals. Although bonds in the railroad manual
were the only group rated in 1912, among them were bonds of affiliated
companies, some of which come within our public utility and industrial
groups (defined in Volume of Financing, page 31 and footnote 7).
the total par amount outstanding was rated in the first four grades
as against only 62 percent for utilities); but when many industrial
issues were threatened with default during the sharp business
contraction of 1920—21, investment opinion was revised down-152 AGENCY RATINGS
ward. An even more abrupt downward revision occurred after
1929, so that by 1932 only 44 percent of the amount of industrial
outstandings was rated in the top four grades. Although an ex-
ceptionally high proportion of industrial outstandings went into
default during the early thirties, industrial earnings recovered
rapidly and most default situations were settled with little or no
loss to investors. The agency ratings reflect this experience: by
1944, 64 percent of total industrial outstandings and 87 percent
of rated industrial outstandings were placed in the top four
grades.
Comparison of Charts 6 and 7 reveals that the proportions of
the total number of outstanding issues not rated were consider-
ably higher than the corresponding proportions based on par
amounts, suggesting that the detailed data needed to rate issues
was obtainable more readily for large than for small issues. A
similar story is told by Table 27, which shows that the percents
of the par-amount totals not rated were consistently higher for
small than for large issues. Even more important is the tendency
revealed by the data for the agencies to assign lower ratings to
the small issues. In each of the years studied the percent of the
par amount of outstanding issues rated i—iv was lower for small
issues than for large, and the gap appears to have widened through
the years. Thus in 1924, 86 percent of the par-amount total of
large issues and 70 percent of the total of small issues were rated
i—iv, while in 1944 the corresponding figures were 63 percent and
24 percent. Part of the differential in favor of large issues arises
from the fact that a larger proportion of such issues are rated;
yet substantially the same results are obtained when only rated
issues are considered. In 1944, for example, 67 percent of the par
amount of all large rated issues had composite grades of I-rv,
while the corresponding figure for the rated small issues was 39
percent. The rating differential in favor of the large issues is
quite pronounced, particularly when it is recalled that many of
the smaller underlying rail issues were assigned high ratings by
the agencies. As we shall see in Chapter 8, large issues are not in-
frequently issued by large obligors, so that the higher ratings
assigned to them may in part reflect the agencies' confidence in
the stability and financial strength of large corporations. Evidence
already presented in Chapter 2 suggests that this confidence has
to some extent been justified in sp far as the incidence of default
is concerned, although realized yields obtained on small issuesVOLUME AND CHARACTERiSTiCS 153
have on the whole averaged above those on large. Chapter 8 will
examine the extent to which these tendencies are observable in
more detailed breakdowns of the data by size of issue as well
as by the asset size of the obligor.
Offerings
Percentage distributions of the par-amount totals of straight bond
offerings by agency rating grade are presented in Table 28 for
quadrennial periods beginning with 1908. Comparison of the
table with the preceding one indicates that on the whole new
issues flowing onto the market had ratings roughly comparable
with those of old issues outstanding. Thus over the period 1916—39,
79 percent of the par amount of offerings was rated i—iv, and the
comparable figure for average outstandings over the same period
was roughly 75 percent; during 1940—43, 69 percent of offerings
was in the first four grades, and in 1944, 60 percent of outstand-
TABLE 28—Percentage Distributions of Offerings among High
and Low Agency Ratings, Four-year Periods 1908—43
COMPOSITE RATING










1908—11 17.9% 6.9% 6.0% 69.2% $4,808.8
1912—15 18.3 27.2 11.0 43.5 4,942.7
1916—19 31.9 34.0 14.0 20.1 4,552.7
1920—23 32.9 46.4 17.7 3.0 7,911.0
1924—27 22.0 .59.7 17.1 1.2 11,011.0
1928—3! 27.9 49.9 18.8 3.4 9,963.1
1932—35 41.6 31.0 20.6 6.8 4,214.2
1936—39 43.9 41.4 11.4 3.3 9,400.9
1940—43 31.8 37.0 8.6 22.6 6,128.8
Railroads
1908—il 39.1 15.2 13,0 32.7 2,210.5
1912—15 33.6 32.8 14.4 19.2 2,189.0
1916—19 41.8 30.4 11.0 16.8 1,473.7
1920—23 74.2 17.7 6.1 2.0 1,591.1
1924—27 46.7 40.8 12.4 0.1 1,940.6
1928—31 48.4 41.2 9.5 0.9 2,074.8
1932—35 43.9 27.2 19.2 9.7 596.2
1936—39 29.0 33.8 36.0 1.2 1,438.6















1908—11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%100.0% $1,732.8
1912—15 5.9 27.7 10.5 55.9 1,929.1
1916—19 25.2 41.5 16.7 16.6 2,020.9
1920—23 18.7 55.0 25.3 1.0 3,134.2
1924—27 18.1 65.5 16.0 0.4 5,529.2
1928—31 26.8 51.9 20.6 0.7 5,406.8
1932—35 54.4 23.8 19.2 2.6 2,445.5
1936—39 56.9 37.4 4.4 1.3 5,178.2
1940—43 42.3 34.9 4.9 17.9 3,450.8
Industrials
1908—11 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 865.5
1912—15 6.8 10.8 3.3 79.1 824.6
1916—19 31.1 24.2 13.1 31.6 1,058.1
1920—23 26.2 52.3 16.1 5.4 3,185.7
1924—27 14.5 61.1 21.3 3.1 3,541.2
1928—31 13.0 53.3 22.3 11.2 2,481.3
1932—35 13.8 47.8 24.2 14.2 1,172.5
1936—39 27.7 52.8 11.5 8.0 2,784.1
1940—43 17.1 40.8 2.4 39.7 1,849.8
Based on Table 52 of Statistical Measures: par-amount data for all large
(straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted annually
to universe totals.
ings had such ratings. The large amounts of industrials and util-
ities not rated in the early forties were direct placements.
Before the Great Depression, the agencies favored the railroads
at offering and rated utilities and industrials low; yet the rails
had the poorest yield and default record in the thirties while the
other industries did reasonably well. The agencies' preference for
the rails in the early period is reflected most sharply in the pro-
portions of total offerings rated in the top two grades. In each of
the six four-year periods from 1908 through 1931 the rails had
the highest proportion rated I—lI; but from 1932 onward the
utilities took the lead. Curiously enough, the industrials had
the lowest proportion of offerings rated i—iv from 1924 onward,
despite their good record in the thirties. The downgrading of rail
bonds at offering really did not get under way on a sizable scaleVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 155
until 1936—39. Whereas 52 percent of their par-amount total was
rated i or n at offering in 1916—35, only 26 percent was so rated
in 1936-43. Corresponding changes in grades iii and iv were from
33 percent to 35 percent, in grades v—ix from 11 percent to 87
percent, and in offerings not rated, from 5 percent to 2 percent.
Although rails were rated five years before utilities and indus-
trials, and were rated somewhat higher at offering, rail debt has
been relatively long-term and stable, so that the volume of high-
grade rail offerings was quite small. Thus only $9.1 billion of rail
bonds in the top four grades were offered in the period 1913—43,
as compared with billion, for utilities. The utilities were con-
sistently the leaders in the volume of high grades flowing onto
the market in every four-year period beginning in 1916, except
1920—23, when industrials led utilities by $2.5 to $2.3 billion. For
the entire period 19 13—43, $1 1.6 billion of industrial offerings
were in the top grades.
of Rated Bonds
Since the agencies do not reveal the details of the procedures em-
ployed in assigning ratings to corporate bond issues, the statisti-
cal characteristics of rated bonds are not without interest. From
materials already presented it is clear that the agencies have as-
signed relatively high ratings to large issues. In keeping with
competent investment opinion before 1932, they also favored the
rails and rated industrials and utilities relatively low, but to some
extent these judgments were laterrevised on the basis of depres-
sion experience. Additional information on the nature of rated
issues is presented in Table 29, which shows distributions of the
par amounts of straight bond outstandings at the beginning of
selected years, by various characteristics.
As the table indicates, before the Great Depression a relatively
large proportion (by volume) of issues rated as high grade were
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, were issues of obligors
having assets of $200 million and over, and matured in over thirty
years. Since then most of these differences have either disappeared
or have been reversed. By 1944, a slightly larger proportion of low
grades were listed on the New York Stock Exchange, were issued
by obligors having assets of $200 million and over, and matured
in over thirty years. No very regular pattern shows up in the lien
position of the high. versus the low-grade issues, although slightly
larger proportions of the high grades were senior liens.156 AGENCY RATINGS
TABLE29—Proportions of OutstandingsCharacterizedby
Large Obligor, Exchange Listing, Long Term, etc., for
Issues with High and Low Agency Ratings, 1920—44












All issues45.5% 73.7% 56.5%33.0%75.1%9.3%
I—TV 53.2 79.4 65.0 35.776.4 10.4
V—TX 18.0 60.6 28.5 27.0 70.8 4.6
1928
All issues47.0 78.0 57.0 24.!67.1 14.7
I—TV 31.7 81.9 60.9 26.067.7 14.4
V—IX 21.2 58.7 36.3 13.863.517.1
1936
Allissues 51.4 84.0 59.8 21.5 69.0 16.3
I—IV 33.0 88.1 63.7 26.3 72.6 12.1
V—IX 47.1 79.9 55.5 14.1 63.2 23.2
1944
Allissues 58.9 90.0 65.7 15.1 67.0 20.6
I—IV 60.9 95.7 70.1 14.5 71.1 19.7
V—IX 65.6 88.0 72.8 19.962.5 19.2
Based on Tables 23, 24, 28, 30, 34, 36, and 40 of Measures, and
special supplementary tabulations: par-amount data for all large (straight)
corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted to universe
totals.
aA"senior lien" is an issue secured by mortgage, collateral, or leasehold,
provided the lien is not entirely junior to that of other issues.
A debenture is an issue not secured by lien.
To a large extent the changes in marketability, size, and term to
maturity reflect changing opinion as to the merits of issues in dif-
ferent industry classifications.
ments of the New York
Thus in 1920 the listing require-
Stock Exchange favored railroads; the
railroads are large obligors; and they were favored by investors
generally and by the ratingagencies.Moreover, the rail issues
were quite important in the par-amount totals for all issues. It
follows that a relatively large proportion of the par-amount rated
i—ivconsistedof issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange and
of bonds of obligors with assets of $200 million and over. Since
the rails are also typically long-term issues, a somewhat larger
proportion of issues rated i—iv was long term than of issues rated
v—Ix.VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 157
Stability of Agency Ratings
Present laws governing the valuation of investments of commer-
cial banks and life insurance companies in corporate bonds re-
quire that defaulted issues be written down to market. In the
absence of other evidence of investment quality, the same rules
pertain to issues that drop "below grade" (i.e., roughly speaking,
below composite grade Iv).Thusthe downgrading of an issue may
prove almost as embarrassing to investors as an actual default.
In either case a capital loss occurs, equal to the difference between
book value and market (or some intermediate value assigned by
the regulatory authorities), with a resultant shrinkage of surplus.
In the event of downgrading, the loss is usually a paper one, but
may become actual if the issue subsequently goes into default or
if the intermediaries are encouraged to liquidate it. It follows
that the stability of the ratings assigned by the agencies, as meas-
ured by the proportion of issues that drop below grade, is of
extreme importance to the investment intermediaries.
Some evidence on this matter is presented in Table 30, which
shows the distributions of the par amount totals in various rating
grades at offering by the rating grade at date of final extinguish-
ment. The table is particularly relevant for life insurance com-
panies and others who typically purchase at offering and hold for
long periods. The table is based on universe estimates of straight
bond offerings, i.e. all large issues and the adjusted 10 percent
sample of small issues.
As the table indicates, 56.9 percent of the par amount of all
bonds rated i at offering (i.e. Aaa under the Moody system) was
still rated iatextinguishment, 21.1 percent was rated iiatextin-
guishment, and so on, so that 90.8 percent was still rated i—iv at
extinguishment and only 8.9 percent had dropped below grade.
As might be expected, the proportions falling below grade at ex-
tinguishment rise as we move down the rating scale. Of the total
par amount of issues rated iv at offering, only 61 percent was
still rated '—iv at extinguishment (43 percent still in fourth grade;
18 percent upgraded), and 35 percent had dropped below grade.
The table shows that there was relatively little crossing over be-
tween issues rated i—iv at offering and those rated v—ix. Thus, of
the amount of the issues originally rated i—iv, 77 percent was still
rated i—iv at extinguishment, and of issues originally rated v—ix,
75 percent was still so rated.158 AGENCY RATINGS
TABLE 30—Offerings 1900—1943inGiven Agency Rating
Grades at Offering, Distributed by Agency Rating at
Extinguishment
COMPOSITERATINGAT OFFERING
COMPOSITE RATING — .
ATEXTINGUISHMENT No
I II III IV I—IVV—IXRating
All Issues
I 56.9%9.0%2.0% 0.5% 12.1% 0.5% 13.6%
II 21.1 56.2 12.21.922.5 0.7 10.3
III 7.2 12.845.2 15.322.6 3.0 8.0
IV 3.6 7.1 17.543.319.814.5 7.4
I—IV 90.8 76.961.0 77.018.739.3
V—IX 8.9 13.3 21.2 35.4 21.0 75.421.5
No rating 0.3 1.6 1.9 3.6 2.0 5.939.2
TOTAL 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Railroads
I 30.42.9 0.9 0.0 9.2 0.0 16.0
II 21.025.85.72.215.60.18.9
III 12.8 16.029.311.1 17.6 3.5 6.9
IV 13.7 12.1 8.7 30.114.7 5.3 10.8
I—IV 77.9 56.844.643.457.18.942.6
V—IX 22.143.0 53.853.741.987.127.6
Norating 0.00.2 1.6 2.9 1.0 4.029.8
TOTAL 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Inthe matter of stability of ratings, as in most other respects,
the rails had the poorest record; only 78 percent of the amount
rated i at offering and 43 percent of that rated iv were still rated
I—IV at extinguishment. Moreover, only 57 percent of rails rated
in the first four grades at offering was still rated in that group
at extinguishment, and there was rather little upgrading of the
lower-grade rail issues. The utilities were the most stable group:
virtually all (99.8 percent) of the amount rated Iat offering
and 65 percent of that rated IV were rated i—iv at extinguishment.
Industrial ratings were also quite stable, the corresponding per-
centages being 98.5 and 62.
In general there was a tendency for issues rated in the top
grades to be the most stable, i.e. the largest proportion of the
amount of offerings remaining in the same rating grade at ex-TABLE 30
(concluded)







I II III IV I—IVV—TXRating
Public iii jijijes
I 71.0%11.6%3.3% 0.8% 14.0% 0.9% 9.9%
II 28.4 75.613.9 2.630.2 1.1 15.8
Ill 0.4 7.247.516.9 22.0 3.6 9.2
IV 0.0 2.220.445.018.916.2 6.4
I—TV 99.8 96.6 85.165.3 85.121.841.3
V—TX 0.0 1.2 13.1 31.4 12.873.523.4
Norating 0.2 2.2 1.8 3.3 2.1 4.735.3
TOTAL 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Industrials
I 82.8 11.0 0.3 0.3 11.1 0.3 15.4
II 3.546.1 13.3 0.9 13.4 0.5 5.1
III 11.4 24.951.514.828.7 1.77.8
IV 0.8 14.0 17.946.126.0 19.5 5.1
I—IV 98.5 96.0 83.0 62.1 79.222.033.4
V—IX 0.5 2.5 14.7 33.5 18.068.712.3
Norating 1.0 1.5 2.3 4.4 2.8 9.354.3
TOTAL 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Basedon Table 58 of Statistical Measures: par-amount data for all large
(straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted annually
to universe totals. The composite rating at extinguishment refers to the
rating assigned an issue within one year before date of final extinguishment,
or at the beginning of 1944 if still outstanding at that time.
tinguishment occurred in grade i,andthe proportion declines as
we move down the rating scale. (This was not true within industry
group, however.) On the other hand, the proportions still in the
same rating grade or higher were remarkably stable. Thus 56.9
percent of grade I at offering was grade i at extinguishment, 65.2
percent of grade ii was i or ii at extinguishment, 59.4 percent of
grade iii was i—rn at extinguishment, and 61.0 percent of grade
iv was i—iv at extinguishment. With respect to the proportion of
offerings rated in the same grade or higher at extinguishment,
grade ii utilities led the rest, 87.2 percent of the amount being
rated i or ii at extinguishment. Grade i industrials were also quite160 AGENCY RATINGS
TABLE 31—Outstandings with High and Low Agency Ratings
at Beginning ofFour-yearPeriods,
Agency Rating at End; 1912—43
Distributed
COMPOSITERATING AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD











1—TVV—TX Rating I—IVV—TX Rating
All Issues
stable (82.8 percent).The rails generally turnedin the poorest
performance.
Another approach to the analysis of the stability of agency rat-
ings may be made by comparing the par amounts of outstandings
in different ratinggradesat the beginning of thequadrennial
periods with their rating grades at the end of the periods (Table
31).Since we wished to remove the adventitious effects of extin-
guishments, an issue was included in a given period only if it was
outstanding throughout the period.
Between 1912 and 1928, few issues rated i—iv at the beginning
of any period fell below grade, while a substantial proportion of
those initially rated v—ix were upgraded. Such downgrading as
occurred usually reflects actual or imminent defaults within the
by
1912—1589.1%10.4%0.5%19.5%76.1%4.4%66.3%13.6%20.1%
1916—1992.1 7.1 0.8 32.2 60.3 7.542.6 22.634.8
1920—2392.9 7.1 0.0 32.0 67.70.3 38.9 36.324.8
1924—2797.7 1.70.6 27.3 69.53.2 7.443.848.8
1928—3184.8 14.9 0.3 5.091.04.0 1.6 12.985.5
1932—3579.1 20.70.2 7.891.4 0.8 0.0 34.465.6
1936—3973.326.00.74.394.51.20.016.983.1





1920—2393.0 7.00.0 29.8 70.20.0 51.3 36.9 11.8
1924—2799.6 0.1 0.333.1 64.5 2.4 0.0 0.0100.0
1928—3188.111.90.04.695.40.00.00.0100.0
1932—3575.524.30.23.796.10.20.00.0100.0
1936—3962.8 37.1 0.1 0.399.70.0 0.0 12.287.8
1940—4398.5 1.5 0.0 6.692.5 0.9 0.0 13.986.1VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTiCS 161
TABLE 31
(concluded)
COMPOSITE RATING AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD
I-IV V-IX -' NOTRATED
PERIOD Composite Composite Corn posite
Rating at End Rating at End Rating at End
No No No
I—IV V—IX Rating I—IVV—IX Rating I—IVV—IX Rating
Public Utilities
1912—15 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 67.8% 17.8% 14.4%
1916—1972.924.52.621.8% 72.1% 6.1% 37.6 32.729.7
1920—2395.1 4.90.0 33.3 66.70.0 30.247.3 22.5
1924—2798.1 1.8 0.1 21.1 76.2 2.726.6 0.0 73.4
1928—3191.4 8.3 0.3 7.2 89.1 3.7 0.0 27.1 72.9
1932—3583.1 16.90.0 2.8 97.2 0.0 0.0 35.1 64.9
1936—3989.6 8.7 1.7 9,3 88.12.6 0.0 0.0100.0
1940—4394.7 1.73.6 4.393.3 2.4 0.0 0.0100.0
Industrials
1912—15 100.0 0.00.0 70.4 3.9 25.7
1916—1999.70.30.073.926.10.053.318.827.9
1920—2388.6 11.40.025.069.8 5.2 34.7 17.348.0
1924—2790.7 7.02.3 31.960.8 7.3 3.960.2 35.9




From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research:
par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues, and for 10 percent of
small issues adjusted quadrennially to universe totals, with issues extinguished
during each period excluded.
major industry groups. Thus the 10 percent of the par amount of
issues of all industries rated i—iv in 1912 that was downgraded be-
fore 1916 reflects the bulge in rail defaults in that period. Simi-
larly the 7 percent of total outstandings of 1916 that dropped
below grade before 1920 was largely the result of street railway
defaults. The 7 percent of the total downgraded in 1920—23 oc-
curred largely in the industrial field, foreshadowing the heavy de-
faults of 1924.8
Between 1930 and 1940 defaults were general and widespread;
S For data on corporate bond defaults, classified by major industry group,
see Volume of Financing, particularly Table A-17 and Chart 25.162 AGENCY RATINGS
in consequence, a substantial proportion of the amount of high-
grades was rated down in each of the quadrennial periods begin-
fling with 1928, and very few of the lower grades were upgraded.
Again, downgrading reflected actual or impending defaults. Rail
defaults were heavy from 1931 on and reorganizations and settle-
ments were unusually slow, so that substantial amounts of rail
issues were downgraded by the agencies. Industrial defaults were
also heavy, but were concentrated in the years 1931—33; in con-
sequence 40 percent of industrial bonds rated i—iv in 1928 and 19
percent of the corresponding group in 1932 were downgraded in
the subsequent four-year periods. At the same time, many indus-
trial defaults were quickly settled, so that a substantial propor-
tion of outstandings of the low-grade issues was upgraded between
1932 and 1936. Except for the period 1916—19, when street rail-
way defaults were heavy, utility bonds had the best over-all record
with respect to stability of ratings. Railroads, public utilities, and
industrials each had an excellent record during the early war
years, 1940—43.
One is impressed by the fact that the percentage of downgrad-
ing is closely related to the default record of corporate bonds,
which is in turn very sensitive to business cycles, and particularly
to major Under present valuation rules, the implica-
tion is that capital values and surplus accounts tend to shrink dur-
ing business contractions at the very time when some assurance of
financial stability is most needed by the investment intermediaries
and their beneficiaries. The sensitivity of agency ratings to short-
run movements in general business activity cannot be adequately
investigated on the basis of quadrennial data, but the matter is
important, and will be pursued further in the next section by
means of specially derived annual series.
Agency Ratings and Business Cycles
To investigate the short-run movements in the volume of bonds
rated as high grade (i—iv) and low grade (v—Ix) by the agencies,
annual series on outstandings were constructed by interpolating
between quadrennial dates on the basis of data for a large sample
of actively traded issues, plus an additional amount of data ob-
tained from the manuals for areas in which the sample seemed
particularly weak.1° The first differences or net changes in the
9Ibid.,pp. 195 if.
10Theinterpolating series were developed from the so-called AnnualVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 163
annual amounts outstanding that were rated i—ivandv—ix are
plotted in Chart 8 against the National Bureau's reference chro-
nology of business expansions and contractions. The chart indi-
cates that the net changes in the amounts of high grades and of
low grades outstanding have varied in roughly complementary
fashion over business cycles, the net change for the high grades
generally expanding during business expansions while that for
low grades contracts, and contracting in periods of business con-
traction, while the net change for the low grades expands. The
implication is that the amount of high-grade securities eligible as
investment outlets for the financial intermediaries typically in-
creases in good times (occasionally, contracts at a slower rate) and
contracts in bad times (occasionally, expands at a slower rate).
Since the series for high and low grades are roughly complemen-
tary they also suggest a possible upgrading by the investment
agencies during business expansions and a downgrading in con-
tractions. Under present valuation standards this would imply a
corresponding expansion and contraction in the surplus accounts
of the financial intermediaries.
Additional evidence on this matter may be obtained by ex-
amining the behavior of the volume of issues upgraded and down-
graded by the investment agencies over business cycles. Ideally
for this purpose we should like to know the gross amounts of high
grade issues formerly rated low grade by the agencies (gross up-
grading), and the gross amounts of low grades formerly rated
high grade (gross downgrading); but reliable information of this
type is available in our records only for the four-year periods
(cf. Table 31), and at least annual data are needed for cyclical
analysis. It is, however, possible to combine the series on offerings,
extinguishments, and outstandings, each classified by agency rat-
ing, to obtain rough annual estimates of net upgrading (gross
upgrading less gross downgrading). Since the estimates are ap-
proximate, two series—or "variants"—of net upgrading were de-
veloped as a check on one another (cf. Chart 9). Although each
variant is subject to an undetermined amount of error, it is be-
Record of Corporate Bond Experience of the original Corporate Bond Project.
These series cover actively traded issues (principally large issues) during the
time that they were in good standing. A supplementary search was made of
the manuals for annual data on the ratings of defaulted issues, and also for
unrated small issues. For the derived series and a description of the method
of derivation see Statistical Measures, Table 1 and the notes in that volume in
the section on characteristics of outstanding issues.—3.5
I-Ugh (I-N)
Universe estimates for straight bonds, yearly totals in par amount, from "Statistical
Measures," Table 1.
Shaded areas, representing contractions in general business activity, and white areas,
representing expansions, are from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's "Measur-
ing Business Cycles" (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), p. 78.
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lievect that valid conclusions may be drawn from them, to the
extent that they are mutually substantiating.
The nature of the two variants of net upgrading is perhaps best
appreciated by first making an assumption contrary to fact, and
then removing it to trace the sources of error. Let us assume, then,
that all issues are rated by the investment agencies over their en-
tire life span. Under such conditions, the net change in high-grade
outstandings (I—Iv) would equal offerings (I—iv) less extinguish-
ments (I—Iv) plus net upgrading (gross upgrading of issues previ-
ously rated v—ix less gross downgrading of issues previously rated
[—Iv). Similarly, the net change in low-grade outstandings (v—Ix)
would equal offerings (v—ix) less extinguishments (v—Ix) minus net
upgrading. After rearrangement of terms, net upgrading can thus
be expressed in two ways:
(1) Net upgradingnet change in outstandings i—iv —of-
fering i—iv +extinguishmentsi—iv, and
(2) Net upgrading =—(netchange in outstandings v—ix —
offeringsv—ix +extinguishmentsv—ix).
The two definitions are equivalent, as may be seen by subtract-
ing one equation from the other and noting that the net change
in total outstandings is equal to the difference between total of-
ferings and total extinguishments.
When an attempt is made to use either of the definitions to
measure net upgrading (or net downgrading, when the sign is
negative), we are confronted by two difficulties, the first stemming
from the fact that not all issues are rated throughout their life,
and the second, from the fact that our records do not contain
complete information on the rating grades of all issues at extin-
guishment. Thus when the available data are substituted in equa-
tions (1) and (2), two different estimates of net upgrading, Vari-
ant i and Variant ii, respectively, are obtained.
Let us consider first the types of error introduced by the addi-
tion or deletion of outstanding issues from the list of rated bonds.
Variant i will be swollen whenever issues previously not rated are
rated high grade, and Variant ii when issues previously rated low
grade are dropped from the list of rated bonds. Up to 1916, in
particular, many utility and industrial issues previously not rated
were rated high grade by the agencies, so that Variant i is suspect
for that period (cf. Chart 9). On the other hand, there appears to
have been a tendency for the agencies to drop a few issues fromVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 167
the list of rated bonds as they closely approached default. To the
extent that such issues were low grade, the net change (v—Ix)
would be reduced by the deletions, so that under Variant ii net
upgrading would be too large (or if negative, net downgrading
would be too small). Something like this probably occurred in the
thirties, which may partially account for the fact that in that
period Variant ii showed less downgrading than Variant i.
The second source of error is that our series on ratings at ex-
tinguishment cover final but not partial extinguishments (i.e.
issues retired in part by sinking-fund call, conversion, etc. prior
to final extinguishment); but since partial extinguishments dur-
ing the period studied comprised only 22 percent of total cx-
tinguishments, the absence of data on the partials should not be
too serious a defect. Since the estimates were obtained by using
ratings for final extinguishments rather than for total extinguish-
ments, net upgrading under Variant i actually measures net up-
grading minus any partial extinguishments that were rated i—iv
at date of extinguishment. Similarly, net upgrading under Vari-
ant ii measures net upgrading plus partial extinguishments rated
v—ix at date of extinguishment. Thus Variant i is too low and
Variant ii too high, a relationship that is confirmed by Chart 9.
If forced to choose between them, we should select Variant II as
the more accurate measure in respect of this source of error, since
most partial extinguishments, by their very nature, are presum-
ably high grade and would not affect Variant ii.
Despite the indicated sources of error, Chart 9 clearly shows
that the two estimates of net upgrading usually behaved similarly,
and this is particularly true of their movements over business
cycles. Like the net changes in outstandings, the net upgrading
series strongly suggest that the agencies upgraded issues during
short-run expansions of general business activity and downgraded
them during business contractions. The evidence in this respect
may be summarized conveniently by means of conformity indexes
showing the relationships of the two variants and their component
series to business cycles (Table 32). A positive index means that
a series usually rises during expansion and falls during contrac-
tion phases of the cycle, and a negative index indicates the re-
verse pattern of behavior. Expansion indexes refer to behavior
during business expansions (i.e. the movement of the series from
the initial trough of each cycle to the peak) and contraction in-
dexes to behavior during business contractions. The full-cycle in-168 AGENCY RATiNGS
CHART 9—Net Upgrading of Outstanding issues by the invest-














Universe estimates for straight bonds,from "Statistical Measure5," Tables 1, 52,
and 55.
Net upgrading is that part of the annual net change in the par-amount total of
bond outstandings rated high (the four best grades) or low (all other grades) that
is attributable to revisions of agency ratings of outstanding issues. Positive values
indicate an excess of upward over downward revisions; negative values, an excess
of downward over upward revisions. Variant I was computed from changes in high
grades and Variant II from changes In low grades. If all issues were rated through-
out their lives and if information on partial extinguishments were available, the
two series would be identical.
Shaded areas, representing contractions in general business activity, and white areas,
representing expansions, are from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's "Measur-



























































































































TABLE 32—Conformity Indexes for Bonds with High and
Low Agency Ratings: Offerings, Extinguishments, Net
Changes, and Net Upgrading, 1908—38
BONDS RATEDI—IV BONDSRATEDV—IX
Expan-Contrac-FullExpan-Contrac-Full
sion Lion Cycle sion Lion Cycle
Net Changes
All industries +67 +33 +45 —100 —67 —82
Railroads —71 0 +14 —71 —50 —57
Publicutilities+33 0 +27 —33 —67—100
Industrials +67 +67 +45 —100 —100—100
Offerings
All industries 0 —67 —64 0 0 —9
Railroads 0 —25 —47 +25 —25 —20
Publicutilities+33 —14 —33 0 —14 0
Industrials +33 —14 0 —33 +14+17
Final Exlinguishments
All industries 0 0 —9 +67 0 —9
Railroads +14 0 —29 +43 —14 +8
Public utilities+67 —33 +45 +33 0 +9
Industrials +67 0 +45 +50 —33 —45
NET UPGRADING, VARIANT INET UPGRADING, VARIANT II
Expan-Conlrac-FullExpan-Contrac-Eull
sion Lion Cycle sion Lion Cycle
All industries +100 +33 +64+100 +67+82
Railroads +14 +43 +38 +43 +43+54
Public utilities 0 +33 +82 +33 +67+82
Industrials +67 +67 +82 +67 +67+100
Based on annual par-amount data for straight corporate bonds from Sta-
t'istical Measures, Tables 1, 52, and 55. Indexes cover six reference cycles
1914—38 for all series except railroads; railroad offerings cover eight cycles
1908—38, and other rail series, seven cycles, 1911—38. These indexes do not
take account of possible leads or lags at reference-cycle turning points.
dcx is based on comparisons of the rates of change of the series
over business contractions with the corresponding rates for pre-
ceding and succeeding expansions, a positive index indicating
that the rates of change are typically lower in contractions than in
expansions. For each type of index, +100 indicates perfect posi-
tive conformity to business cycles, —100 perfect negative con-
formity, and values near zero, negligible conformity.11
ii For a full description of the construction of annual conformity indexesVOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS 171
As the expansion and contraction indexes show for bonds of
all industries and also for industrials, the net changes in out-
standings rated i—iv typically increased during business expansions
and decreased during business contractions. Moreover, all of the
full-cycle indexes are positive, indicating definite positive con-
formity for the group. Conversely, indexes for the net changes v—Tx
are all negative and are generally quite high, showing a definitely
inverted and even more sensitive response to business cycles.
The indexes for high-grade bond offerings indicate low nega-
tive conformity for the full cycle, while those for extinguishments
and for low-grade bond offerings suggest negligible conformity.
When the offering and extinguishment series are combined with
the corresponding net change series, the resultant indexes for net
upgrading, Variant i, generally rise, while those for Variant ix
reverse signs but otherwise change only slightly. In both cases the
indexes indicate systematic positive conformity of net upgrading
to general business activity. Moreover, the fact that the corre-
sponding indexes for the two variants are of about the same order
of magnitude indicates that, despite error, they behaved simi-
larly over business cycles.12
The absence of information on additions and deletions and on
and their uses in analyzing various types of economic time series, see Arthur
F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's Measuring Business Cycles (National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1946), Chapter 5. A brief explanation is given in Vol-
uine of Chapter 4.
12 The conformity indexes in Table 32 do not take account of possible leads
or lags at reference-cycle turning points; and for the annual all-industry series
further analyses were made. Definite changes from the standard reference
pattern appeared only for final extinguishments and for net upgrading. Final
extinguishments typically rose from mid-contraction to mid-expansion (stages
vii to III) for bonds rated i—iv and from trough to mid-expansion (stages i to
III) for bonds rated v—ix. (The latter is also the typical expansion period for
total final extinguishments; cf. Volume of Financing, page 69. note 12.) On
these bases, the conformity indexes show general improvement: for high
grades, +71 for expansions, 0 for contractions, and for the full cycle;
for low grades, + 100, and +82, respectively. Net upgrading, Variant ii,
exhibits no evidence of systematic leads or lags with respect to the reference
cycle. Variant i, on the other hand, typically rose from trough to mid-expan-
sion (stages ito iii), and on that basis the expansion, contraction, and full-
cycle indexes all show perfect positive conformity. It is not clear whether the
net change for high grades typically rose over the full reference expansion
(stages i to v) as assumed in Table 32 or only through mid-expansion (stages
i to ni); nor whether the net change for low grades typically rose over the
reference contraction (stages v to ix) or from mid-expansion to the reference
trough (stages in to ix). On the alternative bases, the indexes for high grades
all fell, but for low grades 'all rose to perfect negative conformity.172 AGENCY RATiNGS
the ratings of partial extinguishments is troublesome, but is not
believed to be so disturbing as to subvert the principal conclusion
that net upgrading conforms positively to business cycles. Some
evidence is available on the cyclical behavior of total partial ex-
tinguishments. Total partial extinguishments show negative con-
formity to business cycles; but since they are a small fraction of
the total (22 percent of total extinguishments) they have a small
amplitude of cyclical variation as compared with the series for
net upgrading.1a Moreover, partial extinguishments serve to re-
duce Variant i and to increase Variant ii (with the greater impact
falling on Variant r, since most partial extinguishments are high
grade); they therefore presumably have an opposite effect on the
conformity of the two variants. The fact that the conformity in-
dexes for the two variants are so similar thus provides additional
evidence of the negligible effect of the partial extinguishments on
the cyclical behavior of net upgrading and downgrading.
In view of the good record of the agencies in predicting default
risk, it is natural to suppose that some part of the downgrading
observed during business contractions is related to corporate bond
defaults. For there is considerable evidence that the agencies, in
their efforts to assess the risk of default, downgraded issues that
defaulted or were about to default (cf. Table 31); and the evidence
is equally conclusive that corporate bond defaults are strongly in-
verted with respect to business cycles (cf. Chart 25 and Table 20 of
Volume of Financing). Superficially, therefore, the net upgrading
and downgrading may simply reflect the changing default status of
outstanding issues. To appraise the importance of this factor, a
special study was made to determine the volume of all downgrad-
ing on defaulted issues that occurred in the year of default or year
before default, and the volume of all upgrading that occurred in
the year of settlement of a default situation, or in the year before
settlement. These amounts, which proved to be surprisingly small
on an annual basis, were then removed from the two variants of
net upgrading, and the conformity indexes were recalculated. In
general, the series were affected only slightly, so that the con-
formity indexes covering issues other than those near default
remained virtually unchanged.14 The small volume of downgrad-
13Fordata on total, partial, and final extinguishments, seeVolumeof Fi-
nancing,TableA-li.
14 The conformity indexes on a i—v basis obtained by eliminating down-VOLUME AND CHARACTERISTICS
ing of defaulted issues in trough years of the business cycle may
appear at first hand to conflict with our earlier finding that
downgrading was large in quadrennial periods of heavy default.
The principal explanation seems to be that the investment agen-
cies were able to foresee defaults several years in advance and
downgraded issues accordingly. Also, issues that went into de-
fault during other than peak and trough years of the general ref-
erence cycle are reflected in the quadrennial data, but not in the
conformity indexes, which ar-e based on the behavior of the series
at turning points. Finally, heavy defaults at the reference troughs
may have affected agency psychology adversely, so that issues were
downgraded at that time even though they did not go into default.
From the evidence, therefore, it appears that the agencies defi-
nitely rated bonds up in expansions and down in contractions, a
finding that is, of course, at odds with the notion that they take
only long-run factors into account in assigning the ratings of
issues other than those approaching default. Since it is known
that earnings coverage enters into the ratings, doubtless the cycli-
cal instability of corporate earnings is one factor that contributes
to the sensitivity of the ratings to business cycles. Whatever the
cause, however, it is clear that the ratings of bond issues con-
tinually shifted over business cycles, and in a way that amplified
the problems of the commercial banks and of other financial
intermediaries.
grading at default and upgrading at settlement are as follows:
NET UPGRADING, VARIANT INET UPGRADING, VARIANT H
Expan-Contrac-FullExpan-Conirac-Full
sion tion Cyde sion Lion Cycle
All industries +100 +33 +64 +67 +67 +82
Railroads —14 +43 +38 +43 +43 +34
Public utilities +33 +33 +82 +33 +67 +82
Industrials +67 +67 +82+100 +67+100
Comparison with Table 32 shows that the elimination of defaults changes
several of the expansion indexes slightly but leaves the others unchanged.
Elimination of defaults changed the expansion indexes only when the average
change per year from trough to peak of the original series was close to zero.
When the downgrading of defaults occurred in a trough year the sign of the
average change per year then changed from plus to minus and when it oc-
curred in a peak year, from minus to plus. Since total downgrading was more
important than upgrading, the contraction indexes were unaffected by the
removal of defaults. In general the volume of issues upgraded at settlement
was negligible.174 AGENCY RATINGS
Reference back to Chart 9 will show that the downgrading was
particularly heavy in the recession years 1920—21 and 1929—32, and
throughout most of the depressed thirties. As a matter of fact,
the downgrading was so heavy in those years that over the full
period studied downgrading exceeded upgrading. Some idea of
the importance of downgrading is indicated by the fact that net
downgrading constituted about 10 percent of total rated out-
standings in 1921, 11 percent in 1931 and 1932, and 7 percent in
1937. Relative to total rated outstandings, net upgrading was
extensive only in 1923, when about 6 percent of the total was up-
graded. (Variant i shows heavy net upgrading in 1915, but the
series is suspect for that year; see the discussion accompanying
Chart 9.) In other years, the proportions upgraded or downgraded,
while less important, still followed the course of the business
cycle. Conformity indexes computed for the proportions up-
graded and downgraded are substantially like those presented
in Table 32.
Despite the short-run cyclical instability of agency ratings, it
is noteworthy that the agencies became progressively more con-
servative during the 1920's, rating up a smaller proportion of
issues (or rating down a larger proportion) towards the close of the
period than at the beginning. The conservatism of the agencies
in the twenties is particularly striking in view of the speculative
excesses of the era.
INVESTOR EXPERIENCE AND AGENCY RATINGS
According to our interpretation of agency ratings, they are an
attempt to rank issues in order of prospective default risk and
of the possible magnitude of default loss. The agencies, however,
make no pretense that the ratings per se are useful as signals for
purchase or sale, and at least one agency specifically warns that
they should not be used in that way. Thus Moody's Investment
Manuals (1953), page v, state:
"As ratings are designed exclusively for the purpose of grading bonds
according to their investment qualities, they should not be used alone
as a basis for investment operations. For example, they have no value in
forecasting the direction of future movements of market prices. Market
price movements in bonds are influenced not only by the quality of
individual issues but also by changes in money rates and general eco-
nomic trends, as well as by the length of maturity, etc. During its life
even the best quality bond may have wide price movements, although
its high investment Status remains unchanged.INVESTOR EXPERIENCE 175
"The matter of market price has no bearing whatsoever on the deter-
mination of a rating and ratings themselves are not to be construed as
a recommendation with respect to 'attractiveness.' The attractiveness of
a given bond may depend on its yield, its maturity date or on other
factors for which the investor may search, as well as on its investment
quality which is the only characteristic to which the rating refers."
To the extent that our interpretation is correct, and the agen-
cies are successful in their forecasts, we should observe a fairly
close inverse relationship between rating grade and default in-
cidence and also between rating grade and default ioss. On the
other hand, since the agencies do not attempt to judge the attrac-
tiveness of an issue, it would not be surprising if the ratings were
found to be rather loosely related to the returns actually obtained
by investors.
The purpose of this section is to determine the validity of these
inferences, in so far as the data permit. We shall first examine
the default rates on corporate bonds in different rating grades,
and then the prices, yields, and loss experience on defaulted issues.
The chapter closes with an investigation of the relationships be-
tween rating grades and over-all yield averages calculated from
offering to extinguishment and from the beginning to the end of
selected chronological periods.
Default Rates for Offerings
Percents of the par-amount totals of bond offerings that subse-
quently went into default are classified by agency-rating grade at
offering in Tables 33 and 34; and quadrennial default rates for
the par-amount totals of issues outstanding at the beginning of
selected chronological periods are similarly classified in Tables
35 and 36. Tables 33 and 36 cover only issues in the experience
samples, while Tables 34 and 35 are based on estimates for all
straight issues.
The tables provide evidence of the remarkable ability of the
agencies to predict default experience on issues of roughly com-
parable type; that is, on issues within the same major industry
group. Table 33, which shows the accuracy of the long-range fore-
casts based on ratings at offering, is particularly interesting in
this respect.. It will be remembered from Chapter 2 that the per-
cent of offerings subsequently going into default is influenced by
the period of offering and extinguishment, and presumably also










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































quality in the agency rating sense. Nevertheless, aside from the
large issues 'of street railways, most of which were not rated at
offering, and the small industrials, for which our sample data
are quite fragmentary, the percents of the amount of offerings
rated i-ivthatsubsequently went into default were consistently
lower than the corresponding percents for offerings rated v-ix.
Moreover, the percents going into default rose rather consistently
from grade ithroughgrade iv.
The agencies appear to have been less successful in predicting
relative default experience at offering as between major industry
groups. For example, large grade iraildefaults were heavier than
large grade iv utilities other than Street railways. Moreover, de-
faults on large issues, grades i—iv, were three times as heavy on
industrials as on utilities other than street railways, and were
almost three times as heavy on rails as on industrials. On the other
hand, the ratings seem to have been more homogeneous among
the lower-grade issues, approximately one-third of the offerings
in all major industry groups except railroads subsequently going
into default, and seven—tenths in the latter industry. From the
data available, it would also appear that the agencies were some-
what more successful in ranking the large issues in order of
default risk than the small issues, possibly because more informa-
tion could be obtained for them. The erratic behavior of the de-
fault rates for small issues may also be explained in part by sam-
pling errors. The data on small issues in Table 33 are quite thin
when cross-classified by rating grade within industry group.
On the whole, the percents of unrated issues subsequently go.ing
into default were above the corresponding rates for the high
grades but below those for low grades. The unrated offerings are
best compared, however, after 1920, when most issues of public
significance were rated by the agencies. The unrated small issues
in that period had higher default rates than either of the rated
groups. The unrated large issues, on the other hand, had lower
default rates than the corresponding grades v—ix. This is prob-
ably the result of the inclusion of private placements in the Un-
rated group of large issues in the later years of the period.
Table 34, which contains annual data on the percents of the
par amount of rated bonds in grades i—iv and the default rates for
bonds rated i—Iv and v—ix at offering, again demonstrates the
remarkable ability of the agencies to rank offerings in order of
risk of default. For all issues combined, the default rates for issuesINVESTOR EXPERIENCE 179
Agencies, Percent Rated High Grade, and Percent of
Bonds Rated High and Low Grade at Offering That
Went into Default before 1944, Annually, 1908—43
ALL ISSUES
TABLE 34—Percent of Par Amount of Offerings Rated by
ParPercent ofPercent











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1914 439.866.1 64.6 43.4 43.8 42.6
1915 338.9 72.4 78.9 28.5 28.9 27.2
1916 606.5 76.4 81.5 24.9 28.9 7.0
1917 371.4 80.5 84.1 25.2 16.9 69.0
1918 488.0 80.2 78.3 21.4 13.3 50.5
1919 555.0 96.0 77.5 8.6 3.7 26.1
1920 478.8 96.9 70.8 14.0 0.2 47.6
1921 674.1 99.3 80.4 10.3 0.3 51.7
1922 929.4 99.5 67.2 11.1 6.3 20.9
1923 1,051.9 99.3 78.7 2.0 0.8 6.4
1924 1,008.1 99.9 81.2 6.1 6.0 6.6
1925 1,093.3 99.4 89.2 1.8 1.4 5.8
1926 1,392.6 99.0 85.7 7.0 4.9 19.1
1927 2,035.2100.0 81.3 16.2 7.8 52.7
1928 1,513.0100.0 70.7 36.9 21.8 73.6
1929 996.5 97.9 70.3 24.3 9.4 61.8
1930 1,539.5 98.9 84.3 13.9 8.8 41.4
1931 1,357.8100.0 89.5 12.2 3.5 85.9
1932 654.6 96.3 81.5 9.9 1.4 55.5
1933 209.0 99.3 33.1 35.4 0.0 52.9
1934 239.4 94.0 68.1 4.5 6.5 0.1
1935 1,342.5 98.2 89.2 0.4 0.0 3.7
1936 2,038.6 99.5 96.6 3.2 3.3 0.0
1937 823.4 99.9 93.3 0.7 0.6 1.6
1938 1,206.0 98.3 94.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
1939 1,110.296.7 96.1 0.9 1.0 0.0
1940 1,275.592.4 89.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1941 1,303.4 74.9 99.9 0.0 0.0 0.Oa
1942 482.2 73.2 89.8 0.0 0.0 0.Oa


































































































































































































































































1909 859.3 55.9 78.4 42.8 33.6 76.3
1910 729.538.7 74.3 20.1 20.5 18.9






1917 931.8 82.6 76.8
1918 549.9 81.4 93.7













1932 702.195.5 82.5 15.6
1933 260.999.4 49.8 42.6
1934 457.792.3 87.8 15.3




1939 2,040.7 98.1 74.9
1940 2,166.089.6 89.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
1941 1,746.181.7 97.4 1.4 0.0 54.8a
1942 762.481.4 86.6 0.0 0.0 0.0







































































































































































































































































































issues, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted annually to universe totals.
Based on less than five offerings.
and special supple-
(straight) corporateINVESTOR EXPERIENCE 185
CHART 10—Proportion of Agency-rated OfferingsThat Later


















Based on par-amount data for straight bonds, from Table 34. Broken lines are cen-
tered five-year moving averages.
ratedlow grade at offering were lower than for those rated high
grade in only 5 of the 36 years covered. The agencies' record in
this respect appears to have been better for the large issues than
for the small issues, a result perhaps due to the limited coverage
of the small issues sample. The record was also better for rails
than for utilities and industrials.
Another important point revealed by Table 34 is that the
agencies were able to detect the deterioration in bond quality in
the twenties—the poorer quality of bonds offered—that was re-
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vealed later bythe actual default experience. Asmeasured by
default rates, the quality of both high grades and low grades
deteriorated in the late twenties. Moreover, the agency ratings,
which may be interpreted as a measure of the average estimated
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Yearof offering
orexpected quality, registered that deterioration, since the per-
cent of rated offerings in the first four grades declined in 1928 and
1929. Chart 10, which compares the annual default rates on rated
offerings with the percents rated high grade, reveals a slight in-
verse relationship for other years as well, with the agency ratings
possibly lagging behind the default rates. The inverse relation-
ship between these series, however, should not be pressed too
far, for it is clearly very slight.15
15Aslight inverse relationship may be detected in the long-term trends of
the series but not in their year-to-year changes. For example, comparisons of
annual directions of change for default rates of rated offerings and percents
rated grade iv or better show that for all industries the series moved in the
oppositedirection in 18 comparisons and in the same direction in 17 com-
parisons. The inverse relationship of annual directions of change was least
pronounced for rails and most pronounced for industrials.
II lilt 11111I 11111111I IIi1111111I,188 AGENCY RATINGS
CHART 10, concluded
?ndus trials
Default Rates on Outstandings
The quadrennial default rates in Table 35, which are based on
all issues that were not in default at the beginning of the quad-
rennial periods, show the precision of the agency forecasts of de-
fault risk over short periods. For each of the forty-seven compari-
Sons possible from this table the default rates on high grades were
below those on low grades. Moreover, the quadrennial default
rates for each major industry group averaged about ten times
higher for low grades than for high grades. For rails the averages
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for utilities, exclusive of 1912—15, when few were rated, 20.6 per-
cent and2.1percent; and for industrials for the same periods,
23.5 percent and 2.3 percent. The default rates on unrated issues
stood about midway between the rates for the high and low
grades, averaging 10.7 percent for rails, 16.3 percent for utilities,
and 13.3 percent for industrials. Defaults were particularly heavy
for high-grade rails in 1912—15 and 1932—35, for high-grade utili-
ties in 1916—19, and for high-grade industrials in 1932—35.
TABLE 35—Quadrennial Default Rates for Outstandings with








AU Issues Large Issues Small Issues
1912—157.0% 49.3%8.5%5.9% 54.3% 8.7%12.6% 19.0% 8.2%
1916—193.421.6 9.2 3.0 19.6 1.55.325.611.5
1920—231.0 18.2 14.90.9 17.822.0 1.2 18.713.4
1924—271.123.5 13.8 1.126.9 0.8 17.313.8
1928—311.422.6 7.20.821.5 6.3 4.624.1 7.5
1932—356.248.949.2 6.146.654.3 7.1 58.548.2
1936—393.321.7 8.0 3.324.2 0.0 3.3 10.312.2
1940—430.48.96.80.27.00.0 3.0 17.811.8
Railroads Public Utilities Industrials





1932—35 10.568.8 0.0 1.841.945.6 7.238.251.9
1936—396.343.40.01.110.9 14.5 1.4 12.28.7
1940—430.6 7.723.30.4 9.7 8.8 0.0 11.92.2
Based on Tables 164, 165, 167 and 168 of Statistical Measures: par-amount
data for all large (straight) corporate issues in good standing at beginning of
four-year periods, and for 10 percent of small issues adjusted quadrennially
to universe totals.
Based on less than five issues.
Data on quadrennial default rates for the individual rating
grades i—Iv are presented in Table 36 for four-year periods and for
selected longer chronological periods. Again the table reflects the
ability of the agencies to rank outstanding issues in order of de-
fault risk, the default rates rising with remarkable consistency190 AGENCY RATINGS
TABLE 36—Quadrennial Default Rates for Outstandings in
First Four Agency Rating Grades at Beginning of Periods,
19 12—43
PERIOD I II III IV I II III IV
Large Issues, All Industries Large, Railroads
1912—13 3.8% 2.7% 15.8% 13.1% 3.9% 2.7% 15.8% 13.2%
1916—19 0.0 1.7 1.9 9.70.00.91.09.7
1920—23 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0
1924—27 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3
1928—31 0.0 0.2 0.3 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 10.3
1932—35 0.5 0.1 8.4 10.5 0.8 0.320.3 15.2
1936—39 0.0 2.2 4.6 5.1 0.0 5.0 10.9 10.3
1940-43 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1920—27 0.9 0.0 3.7 6.3 0.0 0.0 6.0 8.4
1920—31 0.0 0.1 2.6 4.7 0.0 0.0 4.8 6.6
1920—39 2.3 2.0 8.0 8.8 2.9 2.8 12.3 13.1
1924—39 2.0 2.8 4.3 4.7 2.5 4.3 10.6 13.0
1928—39 2.7 4,1 6.1 8.6 3.7 8.723.0 21.5
1932—39 0.2 1.4 6.8 10.6 0.4 3.0 14.822.5
Large,Public Utilities Large, Industrials
1912—15 0.0 0.00.00.0
1916—19 0.0 4.7 3.6 12.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6
1920—23 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.7 0.0
1924—27 0.00.00.00.011.10.00.0 1.0
1928—31 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.4
1932—35 0.00.00.03.90.00.01.612.8
1936—39 0.00.00.02.50.0 0.0 0.0 2.2
1940—43 0.00.00.01.70.00.00.00.0






From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research:
par-amount data for large issues in the periodic experience sample. Default
rates for other than four-year periods are reduced to quadrennial basis; e.g.,
one-half the default rate for 1920—27 was entered for that period.
throughout the table as the rating grade declines.'6 The data for
the longer periods are particularly interesting as showing the
ability of the agencies to forecast default risks over fairly long
periods. For all large issues combined, the default rates within
16Thetendency for default rates on outstanding issues to be inversely re.
lated to agency rating wasalsonoted by Gilbert Harold, op. cit., Chapter 9,
on the basis of his study of 363ratedissues for the period 1929—35.INVESTOR EXPERIENCE 191
each of the long periods were almost perfectly ranked with rat-
ing grade at the beginning of the period.
Default Losses
Tables 37 and 38, which measure the returns on defaulted issues,
show that the agencies were not only able to rank issues in order
of subsequent risk of default but in the order of the magnitude
of default losses as well. Like our other data on the experience
record of defaulted issues, the materials here presented are in
the form of unweighted averages, and, of course, cover only issues
for which sufficient information could be obtained to compute
the relevant statistics.
The average market prices at default classified by rating grade
five years before default indicate that the agencies were able
in advance to rank the subsequently defaulting issues according
to market valuation. Thus the average price at default for large
issues was lower for each successively lower grade, being 60 for
grade i but only 34 for grade iv and lower. Roughly the same de-
cline occurred for the smaller issues as well, except that the aver-
age price at default for the very lowest grades (vI—Ix) was above
that of issues graded iv—v. Sampling errors, however, could well
account for this quirk in the data.
Even more important was the fact that the agencies as many
as five years before default were able to rank issues in order of
payouts after default. Thus among large issues the value at de-
fault of subsequent receipts discounted at 3 percent was 80 for
grade i, but only 53 for grade vi, while for small issues in grades
i—ui and grades vi—ix it was 76 and 69, respectively. Since the value
of subsequent receipts fell almost continuously with agency-rating
grade for both large and small issues, there is little doubt about
the statistical significance of these results.
As might be expected in view of the proximity of default, the
agencies were even more discriminating in the case of ratings
assigned only one year before default. Large issues rated as grade
i one year before default sold at 86 on date of default, while
issues graded vit—ix sold at only 26. Moreover, the value of sub-
sequent receipts on large issues discounted at 3 percent shows a
continuous decline from 111 for grade i, through 46 for grades
vu—Tx. The record of the agencies in ranking subsequently de-
faulting issues according to value of receipts after default appears
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is clear therefore that issues having the highest agency-rating
grades had the most stable prices at default, the smallest capital
losses if sold at that time, and the largest payouts per dollar
invested. On the other hand, the very price stability of the high-
grade issues worked against them from the standpoint of investors
who purchased at default and held to extinguishment. Although
yields obtained from default to extinguishment were rather high
on the high grades, they were not nearly so attractive as those on
the lower grades. Thus for large issues rated grade ioneyear be-
fore default the average yield from default to extinguishment
was 7.9 percent, as compared with 24.5 percent for grade VI;and
similar experience was obtained on the smaller issues. Generally
speaking, therefore, the ratings proved to be good indicators of
default incidence and default loss, but were inversely related
to the attractiveness of issues when purchased at default. These
findings seem to be in keeping with the investment agencies' own
conception of the function of their ratings: that is, that the rat-
ings measure the intrinsic quality of bond issues rather than their
attractiveness at prices prevailing in the market.
Additional evidence of the long-range forecasting ability of the
agencies is presented in Table 38, which shows promised yields,
realized yields, and loss rates on defaulted issues calculated from
offering to default and to extinguishment, classified by rating grade
at date of offering. As is immediately apparent from a comparison
of the yields promised at offering with the rating grades, the mar-
ket and the agencies were in fair agreement as to the risks of sub-
sequent default. The table shows further that the realized yields
from offering to default were lower for each successively lower
grade from i through v, and were positive only for large issues in
grades iandvii—ix and for unrated issues. The explanation is the
ability of the agencies to predict defaults in the near term, with
the result that the high grades were outstanding on the average
for a much longer period before default than the low grades.1T
Since the promised yields moved inversely to grade, and the real-
ized yields moved directly, the loss rates, or annual rates of capi-
tal loss, rose continuously from grade ithroughgrade Ix.Theloss
17Forthe composite rating groups shown in Table 38, the respective average
number of years that issues were outstanding before default were, for large
issues, 21, 12, 8, 8, 6, 6, 3, and 20; and, for small issues, 12, 8, 6, 4, and 18.
The last figure in each case refers to issues not rated by the agencies at
offering.iNVESTOR EXPERIENCE 195
rates from offering to extinguishment also showed the same pat-
tern of behavior, rising as quality declined.
The extremely high yields promised on large issues of the very
lowest grade reflects the fact that many of them were offered dur-
TABLE 38—Yields and Loss Rates up to Default and over
Life Span of Issues Defaulting 1900—1943 Classified by
Agency Rating at Offering
FIRST OFFERINGFIRST OFFERING TO
TO DEFAULT EXTINGUISHMENT












II 29 4.7 —2.1 6.8 1.7 3.0
III 60 5.5 —5.6 11.1 1.3 4.2
IV 118 6.3 —6.2 12.5 1.7 4.6
V 87 7.1—10.4 17.5 —0.2 7.3
VI 23 11.6 —7.0 18.6 1.5 10.1
VIl—IX 13 22.8 3.0 19.8 15.2 7.6
I—IV 219 5.8 —.5.0 10.8 1.6 4.2
V—IX 123 9.5 —8.4 17.9 1.7 7.8
Norating 207 5.0 1.1 3.9 3.3 1.7
Small Issues
I—Ill 6 5.7 —1.1 6.8 0.8 4.9
IV 32 6.4 —4.9 11.3 1.0 5.4
V 25 6.6 —9.9 16.5 —0.5 7.1
VI—IX 14 19.5 —4.9 24.4 6.6 12.9
I—IV 38 6.3 —4.3 10.6 1.0 5.3
V—IX 39 11.2 —8.1 19.3 2.0 9.2
Norating 42 6.0 0.0 6.0 4.2 1.8
From Table 217 of Statistical Measures, covering issues in the default
experience sample. Yields and loss rates are unweighted averages. For issues
still outstanding on January 1, 1944 liquidation is assumed at prices prevailing
in the first quarter of that year.
ing periods of corporate reorganization. Most institutional in-
vestors were prevented from purchasing them at that time, and
other prospective purchasers were wary, so that the market values
of the securities were unduly depressed at offering. The result was
that although the loss rates were very high, the yields realized from196 AGENCY RATINGS
offering to default were higher than on any of the better issues,
and were also exceptionally high from offering to extinguishment.
Aside from the exceptional behavior of the very low-grade is-
sues, one is struck by the rough homogeneity of the realized yields
on defaulted issues calculated from offering to extinguishment.
Although loss rates rose as quality declined, so did the promised
yields, so that investors who held to extinguishment actually ob-
tained approximately the same realized rates of return on de-
faulted issues of various grades. The implication is that the mar-
ket was able during the period studied to compensate roughly
through the higher yields promised at offering for the larger losses
on lower-grade investments. But by the same line of reasoning, it
is evident that neither the rating grade nor the promised yields
provided useful forecasts of the realized yields on defaulted issues
held from offering to extinguishment.
Average Life-span Yields and Loss Rates
(nondefaulted and defaulted issues combined)
The observed relationships among the intrinsic quality of bond
issues, as reflected in agency ratings, and the incidence and size of
default losses are particularly relevant to the small investor who
is unable to diversify and thus balance off default losses against
capital gains on issues called, converted, etc. For the small in-
dividual or small institutional investor in corporate bonds, the
purchase of the top grades provides an insurance against ruinous
default losses. The large investor, however, is theoretically less
interested in the magnitude of default losses on individual issues,
since—barring institutional rules and restrictions that may prove
temporarily embarrassing in periods of heavy defaults—such losses
may usually be balanced against comparably large capital gains.
The large investor is primarily interested in the possible use of
agency ratings, and of other measures of bond quality, as indica-
tors of the relative attractiveness of different issues, and, in par-
ticular, of the probable size of their realized yields. Although the
agencies do not claim that the ratings alone are effective measures
of the attractiveness of bond issues in this sense (and from the
preceding table, the evidence is against their effectiveness as such
for bonds that went into default), the agencies, along with other
investment analysts and the market generally, are as a matter of
fact engaged primarily in the process of evaluating the investment
quality of different issues. It is thus important to know how theiNVESTOR EXPERIENCE 197
various quality measures are related to the rates of return actually
received by investors.
Some evidence on this matter is presented in Table 39 which
shows the weighted average yields and loss rates for all bond of-
ferings in the experience samples, classified by rating grade at
offering. Although the table combines the experience of bonds
offered at various times during the period 1900—1943, within which
basic yields on high grades varied widely, itis clear from the
close relationship between promised yields and agency ratings
that both the market and the agencies were influenced by similar
factors in the process of appraising the quality of corporate
bonds.18
The realized yields for all large and for all small offerings
showed an irregular tendency to be higher the lower the rating
grade at offering. Thus over the period 1900—1 943—a period spall-
fling a great war, a great depression, and the start of a second
great war—large investors holding well diversified aggregates
from offering to extinguishment did best by concentrating on the
lower-grade issues. More detailed data presented in Statistical
Measures, Tables 184 and 185, show the same pattern for rails,
utilities, and industrials in the two size groups.
The data for total offerings include irregular offerings issued on
an exchange basis during corporate reorganizations, as well as
those offered in the regular way. The treatment of the irregular
offerings in the yield analysis is troublesome. On the one hand,
they are frequently held by even the most conservative investors
until the obligor has recovered fully from the default situation, so
that the total experience (on regulars and irregulars) is relevant
for such investors. On the other hand, reorganization securities
are sold by some investors and cannot legally be purchased by
others, so that the experience on the regular offerings is more
relevant for such investors. Another way of looking at the matter
is that investors necessarily take up all of the offerings included
In our records, so that the experience on the total best reflects
aggregate investment experience; but many conservative investors
18Thecharge that the agencies follow the market in assigning their ratings
is frequently leveled against them, and is particularly difficult to answer from
data on outstandings, since the two (i.e. ratings and promised yields) are both
sensitive to changes in the credit standing of the obligors. In so far as offer-
ings are concerned, however, the charge is invalid, since ratings are assigned
to most public offerings before the date of offering (i.e. before the assignment


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































would purchase only the regular offerings and selltheir-
regulars.b9
To show the results of holding only regular offerings, the ir-
regular offerings have been excluded from the second set of figures
shown in the table; and, as a further refinement, the regular of-
ferings since 1920 are presented separately, since most regular
offerings were rated by the investment agencies after that date.
These data indicate a definite step-down in the realized yields on
the large issues between grades iv and v, and on the small issues
between grades inandiv, the yields in each case first rising up to
grades iii or iv, then falling, and then rising again toward the tail
of the table. The peculiar behavior of the yields of the regular
offerings results largely from the combination of issues offered
and extinguished in the different periods during which they were
rated by the agencies. For example, for both large and small regu-
lar issues, the realized yields of offerings in 1920—3 1 that were ex-
tinguished in 1932—43 were higher the better the rating grade,
while the yields of those both offered and extinguished in the
period 1932—43 were inversely related. In general, although not
uniformly throughout all minor periods, the low grades did bet-
ter than the high grades unless the issues were subjected to the
heavy default risks of the Great Depression. When the periods
are combined as in Table 39, the large regular offerings show that
the high grades did better, while the small regular offerings show
practically the same yields for high and low grades. But this is
largely a matter of timing and weighting. The yields realized on
low grades were generally higher than on high grades; but the
19Afurther technicai difficulty arises from the fact that our yield statistics
on total offerings involve a small amount of double counting, since the ex-
perience records on some reorganization issues(i.e.irregular offerings of
straight issues exchanged in settlement for regular offerings of straight issues)
are included for five years in the experience records of the regulars for which
they were offered in exchange. An undetermined amount of the irregulars
(straight irregular offerings received in exchange for other than straight is.
sues) were not so included, and no double counting would be involved for
them. Moreover, the five.year experience record on such irregulars as were
included in the life-span yields of regulars is usua]ly not sufficient to reflect
their record fully. For these reasons, it seems sensible to view the experience
record of the total of regulars and irregulars as more typical of that of holders
of straight bonds than the record for straight regulars alone. This, however,
is essentially a matter of judgment, since there are no statistical guides. The
reader may choose for himself, for in almost all cases the yield statistics in
this volume and in Statistical Measures are presented separately for total
and for regular offerings.INVESTOR EXPERiENCE 201
reverse was true when the experience records of the issues spanned
the Great Depression.
Since 98 percent of the total par amount of all bonds rated at
offering (regulars plus irregulars) fell in the first six grades during
the period studied, the effective range of the table is from grade I
throughgrade vi. During that period also, only 15 percent of the
total fell in grades v—vi,andin the most recent years the majority
of these were irregular. It would appear therefore that the Comp-
troller's ruling of February 1936, which precludes commercial
bank purchase of speculative issues (those generally conceded to be
below grade Iv), is not particularly restrictive. Moreover, as has
been noted, the realized yields on most regular offerings below
grade iv were not so attractive on the whole as those on the higher
grades.
The loss rates in Table 39 also bear out this point. Capital gains
occurred for each class of large offerings through grade Iv, and for
small offerings through grade iii.Forthe regular offerings capital
losses were rather general throughout the remaining categories.
On the other hand, substantial capital gains occurred on a few of
the very low-grade irregular offerings, particularly those that ap-
peared during the corporate reorganizations of the late thirties
and early forties.
In summary, it would appear that defaults and losses were on
the whole larger for low-grade issues than for high grades, so that
a program of purchasing only medium to high-grade issues would
have worked out better for most small investors. Theoretically,
the reverse was possible for large investors, since they were in a
position to average out the higher risks on the lower-grade issues;
but in practice many large investors are prevented from acquiring
a broadly diversified list of low grades by company policy or regu-
latory authority. The outcome of purchasing low grades was also
largely dependent upon the timing of the investment with re-
spect to major investment cycles. On the average and in the aggre-
gate, low grades did better than high grades, but this was not true
of low grades that were subjected to the heavy default risks of the
Great Depression, especially those offered in the late twenties.
Average Yields and Loss Rates
over Chronological Periods
Weighted average yields and loss rates over selected chronological
periods, classified by rating grade at the beginning of the period,202 AGENCY RATINGS
are presented in Table 40. The table covers only issues in the pe-
riodic experience sample (issues in good standing for which real-
ized yields could be computed). The periodic realized yields are
relevant for investors interested in the average trading profits ob-
tained on issues of various grades, while the loss rates reflect
average price stability and are of interest to those in search of
liquidity. Since most issues included in the yield computations
were outstanding throughout the periods covered, a zero loss rate
in a given instance implies that the issues were selling at investor's
book value at the end of the period.20 Similarly, a positive loss
rate indicates that the issues were selling below book, while a nega-
tive rate implies that they were selling above.
Over most of the longer of the assumed periods of investment
the realized yields on low grades were above those on high grades,
both for the large issues and for the small. The exceptions—
1924—39 and 1928—39—indicate the weakness of a low-grade port-
folio purchased near the beginning of a period of heavy defaults
or shortly before a general collapse in bond market values. Over
the four-year periods also, the yields on low grades averaged above
those on high grades (for the large issues the averages are 4.4 and
5.6 percent for high and low grades, respectively; for the small
issues, 4.6 and 7.1 percent). Thus investors who could afford to
bear the risks and wait out periods of unusual market disturbance
would on the whole have obtained larger returns on the lower-
grade issues.
Our periodic experience tables include irregular issues (or
rather, outstanding issues that appeared initially as irregular
offerings) as well as regular issues. To check whether the market
distinguishes between the two classes of issues after the irregulars
have seasoned, a special section has been added to Table 40 show-
ing the yields and loss rates for large issues (all industries) after
removal, from each group of bonds outstanding over the given
periods, of those that were offered irregularly in the preceding
four years. This section of the table may be interpreted as cover-
ing regular issues and seasoned irregulars. Comparison with the
yields for all large issues shows only minor changes for most pe-
riods. In particular, the averages of the realized yields over the
four-year periods remains unchanged at 4.4 percent for high grades
and 5.6 percent for low grades, and the yields for the longer of


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the assumed periods of investment were virtually unaffected.
Again we conclude that investors who purchased outstanding
issues would, on the average, have obtained higher returns on
the low grades than on the high grades. In subsequent tables of
this report, we shall continue to distinguish between regular and
irregular offerings, but will disregard the distinction in the pe-
riodic experience tables.21
Although the low-grade issues afforded higher returns over most
periods, their prices and yields were much less stable than those of
the high grades. Over the four quadrennial periods 1912—15,
1916—19, 1928—31, 1936—39, classified earlier as periods of market
deterioration (cf. Table 23 and the related text discussion), both
high grades and low grades fell below investors' book values, but
price declines were greatest for the low-grade issues (for large
issues the average loss rate over the four periods was 3.5 percent
for bonds that had grades i—Iv at the beginning of the period, and
9.5 percent for grades v—Ix). Contrariwise, 1920—23, 1924—27, and
1940—43 were periods of market appreciation, over which both
high and low grades rose above book values; but the rise was
greatest for the low grades (for large issues the average loss rate
over the three periods was —1.6 percent for grades i—iv, and —3.8
percent for grades v—Ix). The period 1932—35 was exceptional. The
market generally improved over that period and capital gains ac-
crued on the high grades; but the realized yield on low grades, al-
though averaging out at the high level of 15.6 percent per annum,
was still below the 16.5 percent promised at the beginning of the
period. To a large extent the failure of realized yields on low
grades to move above promised yields during 1932—35 may be
attributed to the rail group, where defaults were unusually heavy.
In the industrial and utility fields earnings recovered rapidly
during the same period, so that low-grade issues did much better
than high grades.
Realized yields and loss rates for the long periods were some-
what more stable than for the four-year periods, as might be ex-
pected from the fact that prices paid and received on the initial
and terminal dates have less effect on the realized rate of return,
the longer the period of investment. Otherwise, the yields and
loss rates behaved very much as during the four-year periods.
21Itwill be observed (ci. footnote 19) that double counting is not involved
in the periodic experience tables, since irregular offerings of issues received
in exchange for regulars are included only once in each period.210 AGENCY RATiNGS
Over the periods 1920—31 and 1928—39, which were previously
classified as periods of market deterioration (cf. Table 23), capital
losses accrued on both high and low grades, but most heavily on
the low-grade issues. Conversely, the period 1920—27 was one of
market appreciation, with widespread capital gains, especially on
the low-grade issues. The periods 1920—39, 1924—39, and 1932—39
were exceptional. The market over these periods was classified
in Chapter .2r as improving, since most high grade issues had fully
recovered from the depression lows and the utilities and indus-
trials were selling above the prices prevailing at the beginning of
the periods. This was not true of the low grades, however, which
were still suffering from the depression experience. In conse-
quence, over these periods of general market appreciation, the
high grades did better than the low grades as measured by the
loss rates.
Comparison of the statistics for small and large issues indicates
that the two behaved roughly the same over most periods. For
high grades, the realized yields and loss rates averaged out about
the same for the two size groups over the four-year periods of in-
vestment. The realized yields were somewhat higher on the small
issues over most of the longer periods, but since the size differ-
entials in promised yields were not so great as in realized yields,
loss rates on high grades were generally lower on small issues than
on large. The yields and loss rates on low grades in the two size
groups agree less well, particularly those covering the four-year
periods. Since the data become progressively thinner as we move
down the rating scale, the irregularities may be explainable to
some extent by sampling errors.
In summary, the principal conclusion to be drawn from Table
40 is that the agency ratings serve as rough indexes to price and
yield stability. On the average, realized yields on low grades were
somewhat above those on high grades, but investors seeking price
stability should have avoided the low-grade issues.